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Abstract
This paper analyzes the labor market for collegiate football players and argues that professional
football teams have discriminating preferences when making their hiring decisions. An empirical
analysis of panel data of 32 NFL teams in recent seasons is carried out to test the effects of such pref-
erences on the performance of teams. The results provide strong evidence that certain criteria, which
do have a high inﬂuence on a player’s chances to start a career in Professional Football, have actually
little inﬂuence on team-efﬁciency whatsoever. Consequently, this implies that discrimination in the
form of hiring preferences create a sub-optimal result in terms of building a team, as well as for the
overall labor market in Professional Football.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J7, J2, L83, C23.
Keywords: Labor market in sports, discrimination in hiring, production efﬁciency, stochastic produc-
tion frontier.
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When reading one of the countless Draft evaluation magazines in the month leading up to the draft of
the National Football League (NFL) quite regularly terms and phrases like ‘a bit undersized ’ , ‘has
a smallish frame ’ , ‘has exceptionally short arms’ , ‘has too small hands to get a ﬁrm grip of the
football ’ ,‘lacks ideal bulk ’ and rarely even ‘is too tall ’ are attributed to evaluated players. As the
hiring of unproven amateur football players out of the NCAA collegiate football system is certainly a
highly complex matter, it is safe to assume that there are certain signals that are of considerably high
importance during the evaluation and scouting process. One of this easy accessible signals available as
public information is the physical appearance and collegiate background of players in the draft pool. The
interesting question is: How relevant is this signal and is it actually an efﬁcient indicator for talent and
potential to make a career in Professional Football? This is certainly of high relevance, especially from
a player’s point of view, as there are hundreds of college athletes losing eligibility for playing in the
college sports system (NCAA). They basically end up being jobless if they do not get picked up by an
NFL team in the annual draft process. If it should turn out that teams show a tendency towards relying on
certain personal characteristics as signals, it is of high interest if these characteristics do actually have an
inﬂuence on the production process of the teams. Should this not be the case or if there is only evidence
for minimal inﬂuence, one can argue that the draft and in particular the player evaluation process contains
major inefﬁciencies. Not only will they have severe implications on hundreds of careers of young athletes
who often attain low levels of education because they dedicate their lives to playing semi-professional
Football in the NCAA, basically without any compensation1. To sum up, the intention of this paper is
to test if hiring decisions in the NFL are, at least partly, based on irrational reasoning. This is highly
important because of the strong consequences for the labor market and and the severe implications for
job perspectives of a large number of young college athletes.
Similar to the growing literature on discrimination in labor markets, where issues like discrimination
for gender2, color of skin (Goldsmith et al., 2006), sexual orientation (Weichselbaumer, 2003) , ethnical
origins of applicants’ names (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004) and even physical appearance are inves-
tigated empirically, this paper interprets hiring preferences for certain player characteristics as a form of
labor market discrimination. Numerous papers investigate labor market discrimination in sports (Kahn,
1The semi-professional character of NCAA IA football is often questioned as NCAA colleges dedicate a huge amount of
effort and resources to running their football programs. A number of papers argue that compensation for College players should
reﬂect the actual rent they generate for the Colleges they play for. Brown (1993) discusses in detail how much rent a premium
football player generates during his football career in the NCAA. Consult Meggyesy (2000) for a critical discussion of the
NCAA system. Eckard (1998) and Kahn (2007) provide an excellent overview.
2Discussed by numerous recent contributions. Consult Blau and Kahn (1992) for an overview on the early literature.
21991), but little focus has been on discrimination for physical characteristics.
From the seminal work of Scully (1974), focusing on payment in the Major League Baseball (MLB)
by introducing a production function concept, to recent work on European Soccer by Espitia-Escuer and
GarcIa-CebriAn (2004), the National Basketball Association (NBA) (Hoﬂer and Payne, 1997; Lee and
Berri, 2008) and the National Hockey League (NHL)(Kahane, 2005; Heyne, Fenn and Brook, 2006) re-
spectively, productivity and efﬁciency analysis in Sports Economics has used different approaches and
technical methodologies to evaluate the production process of teams in numerous papers. Little, though,
has been done on the efﬁciency of NFL teams, which is most likely a result of the highly complex nature
and multilayered structure of the game of Football3(Borland, 2006). While Hendricks, DeBrock and
Koenker (2003) focus on individual player performances based on when they were drafted this paper
relates draft decisions to team performance. As a common tool ﬁtting the task of this paper Stochastic
Frontier Analysis is employed to analyze the effect of hiring preferences on production efﬁciency of 32
NFL teams over the time span of 8 years. The analysis follows a methodology introduced by Huang
and Liu (1994) and later reﬁned in Battese and Coelli (1995) and Battese and Coelli (1996). Using this
methodology allows to estimate team (in)efﬁciency by specifying a Production Function and testing for
player speciﬁc personal characteristics as inﬂuences on production efﬁciency. While Battese and Coelli
(1996) uses stochastic frontier analysis to identify farmer speciﬁc efﬁciency effects in an analysis of Aus-
tralian agriculture productivity, numerous papers have adapted the methodology to measure production
efﬁciency in many different areas. Dawson et al. (2000) employs stochastic frontier analysis to measure
managerial efﬁciency in English soccer, while Scully (1994) focuses on managing efﬁciency in football,
basketball and baseball employing survival analysis.
The paper is organized in the following way: Section2 gives a short overview on the institutional set-
tings of the NFL, the NCAA and the annual NFL Draft process. Section3 introduces a simple model of
team decisions based on maximization of output and presents two central propositions, section4 empiri-
cally analyzes hiring preferences in the NFL draft and tests one of the propositions postulated in sectio3.
Section5givesashortoverviewondataandintroducestheeconometricapproachaswellasmethodology
to test the second proposition. Section6 presents the main results, while section7 concludes.
3If one breaks down an American Football team, each (NFL)-team is divided into three sub-units who operate on a high
degree of independence to produce the ﬁnal output. These three sub-groups are further divided into several different positions,
each requiring different physical characteristics and abilities.
32 A short introduction to the NFL Draft
Hiring new players in the National Football League is mainly done in the draft system. This means that
the majority of players are hired by selecting them directly out of College. So the main recruitment pool
for young player, i.e. new employees, is the amount of players in the NCAA football system. The current
NFL rules for draft eligibility state that a collegiate athlete has to be at least three years removed from
high school leaving age. In the standard case, this means that a collegiate football player has to stay in
College until he has ﬁnished his ‘Junior year’ until he can declare to enter the NFL draft process. The
NCAA standard rules, however, state that the maximum tenure of playing in a College, participating
in the NCAA system, is four years. Athletes are forced to leave the team after their ‘Senior year’.4
This rather tight window involves some crucial career decisions for young athletes: They have to decide
whether to leave early after their third year, in case their value is high enough to make it to the pro-level,
or to stay the maximum tenure and risk losing value instead of increasing it5.
TheactualtechnicalprocedureoftheNFLDraftisrathersimple: Priortotheprocess, attheendofthe
regular season, teams are ranked in reverse order with respect to their success in the most recent season.
This ranking represents the order in which all teams are allowed to make their selections on the draft
weekend, which is usually held on a Sunday in late April. All teams can potentially pick out of a huge
pool of players meeting the eligibility conditions. The process is organized in a certain time schedule,
with the ﬁrst two rounds being done on Saturday and the remaining 5 rounds on Sunday. The time a team
is ‘On the clock ’ to make a decision has previously been set at 20 minutes and was recently reduced to 10
minutes in 2008. Trades within the draft procedure are allowed and can be quite frequent. So with every
round of the draft and with every single pick the assumption is that, neglecting teams speciﬁc needs for
certain positions, the overall talent pool becomes smaller. The whole process continues until, after the
ﬁnal pick in round 7, all players, who are considered good enough for the league, are taken and therefore
have a job6. The overall draft process is the most important opportunity for teams to hire new players and
build their rosters, as Free Agents, who are veteran players free to be signed by any team, come at a much
4Consult www.ncaa.org for more details on NCAA regulations and eligibility rules. For reasons of simpliﬁcation we
assume the standard case here as the status quo.
5One possible and frequent reason for this is the possibility to sustain injuries during or before a player ﬁnishes his Senior
year. Such an injury certainly has the potential to dramatically reduce a players value or even end a career.
6For the porpoise of simplicity Rookie Free Agents (FAs), i. e. players who get picked up after the draft are not taken into
account here. This is certainly justiﬁable as Rookie FAs usually face huge obstacles in their path to making an Opening-day
roster than drafted players do. In addition to this very few un-drafted players become signiﬁcant contributors on their team. In
some way a large amount of ‘productive ’ Rookie FAs would certainly contradict the idea that only the most talented players
make it to the league. This would actually provide an even stronger argument in favor of the theory that there are inefﬁciencies
in the NFL hiring process and in the way teams evaluate players. It is also true that being drafted does not guarantee a job for a
whole NFL season, but it increases the chance of being employed dramatically.
4higher price than rookies. The reason for this is the existence of minimum salaries, which are higher due
to seniority rules built into NFL contract regulations. Another fact highlighting the strong implications
of the draft is that players who do not get picked and spend some time out of football have little chance
to make it to the league later on. The NCAA is basically acknowledging the fact that many leftovers are
there at the Football labor market every year. The title of this paper is a reference to a series of ofﬁcial
NCAA television spots propagating the ideas and principles of NCAA collegiate sports by pointing out
the gains of students from participating in sports in college. The fact that DIV IA football is basically
resembles fulltime professional sports, leaving few time for studying, however, is not mentioned.
3 Hiring Preferences: A simple model
Before we can build a simply model to illustrate draft decisions in the NFL we need to make three crucial
assumptions. All three of them are necessary to sufﬁciently simplify the formal approach.
Assumption 1. Teams are win maximizers. Consequently all decision makers inﬂuencing an NFL team
organization are optimizing success of sporting operations.
Assumption 2. Teams produce output (wins) by employing work force. The more talented their players
are, the higher is the level of output.
Assumption 3. The main hiring pool of employees for NFL teams is the annual rookie draft.
While assumptions2 and3 are rather plausible, assumption1 needs a closer look: Although sports
economists have assessed that teams in major US sports tend to be proﬁt maximizers one can certainly
make an argument in favor of NFL teams as being win optimizers. The regulations of the NFL enforce a
salary cap on all teams in the league and restrict the maximum payroll they can assign to salaries. A brief
look at team payrolls in the NFL reveals that all teams are operating more or less exactly at the salary cap
level. Consequently, if we only look at the sports related operations of teams we can certainly state that
proﬁt maximization cannot be the objective of any team in the NFL. From this perspective teams have
to be win maximizers, as no other strategy would be reﬂected in the way teams are managed concerning
their expenditures on players.
According to the speciﬁc design of the NFL draft process as described section2 one can assume
a certain form of output that teams produce by employing players the acquire through the draft out of
college. The additional assumption would be that team ofﬁcials consider individual characteristics of
players to inﬂuence their productivity. Consequently it is possible to formulate the relation how a team’s
productions process depends on drafting players in each round of the draft as
5Yi = f(Ri; Fi; Q); (1)
where Ri is team i’s draft rank in each round from 1 to 7. F is a vector including factors like the rank
of other teams and team-individual personal targets. Equation1 states that the sooner a team picks, the
more it will beneﬁt from picking. This beneﬁt for the production process is decreasing with the teams
draft rank, which means that that¶Yi
¶R < 0, and ¶2Yi
¶R > 0 holds. Overall beneﬁt decreases with every round.
This assumption reﬂects the approach of teams to rank players and preassign them to an estimated draft
round. The overall quality level of the draft is measured by Q which indicates the average potential of
all players who are eligible and, consequently, the focus of this analysis. So we can deﬁne this overall










In equation2 the quality depth of a draft depends on two factors, where Xi deﬁnes player i’s talent
level and Zi denotes a player’s individual publicly known physical, as well as other characteristics. So Z
is deﬁned as a vector of player i’s publicly known personal characteristics. Both sets of indicators, X and
Z, are assumed to be the observable manifestations of a latent variable G, describing the actual overall
talent level of a player and deﬁning the success he is able to attain. The relation is given as
Gi = f(Xi;Zi;Qi); (3)
which means that the observable college production of a certain player is related to his actual unob-
servable talent level Xi, his physical endowments Zi and some stochastic term Q reﬂecting effort, injuries
or college team speciﬁc effects.7 It is important to note that teams only have limited information on Q
and limited direct information on G. Consequently, the assumption is that they tend to evaluate players
relying mostly on the signals X and Z. As team managers and scouts are assumed to believe that Xi
is partly deﬁned and interrelated with Zi, it is plausible to assume that teams will foremost rely on the
personal characteristics Z as signals for player potential. Especially given the fact that Z is free public
7These effects could be related to different coaching philosophies, as football is a highly diversiﬁed game in terms of
different tactics and approaches.
6information. Any team ofﬁcial (i.e. General Manager8, GM) now has the intention to maximize over-
all team production by forming a roster. This will be inﬂuenced by fact that the sum of spending for
contracts is limited by the previously mentioned existence of a league wide salary cap, denoted by C,
in the form as it currently exist for the NFL. This requires the crucial assumption that NFL team ofﬁ-
cials are performance maximizing. It is not implausible as proﬁt maximization should also lead to win




















where Z and X with higher case O or D represent inputs on offense and defense. YD denotes produc-
tion from Defense, while YO indicates production from Offense. From this the Lagrangian for the GM’s















t ) C]: (5)
x is a stochastic parameter deﬁned as 0 < x  1, that describes how big the effort level of team i is,
given players’ decisions on their effort contribution and the coaches’ ability to maximize overall effort
of the whole team. Here the assumption is that the only way a GM can inﬂuence effort is by changing
the coaches. pZ
t and pX
t denote the prizes of one ‘unit’ of the respected talent indicators. These prizes are










t are the available units of Z and Z in the draft of year t and Xt and Zt the overall
in-league levels of Z and X. Following the equation above, the only signiﬁcant way a GM can directly
inﬂuence production of his team is to decide which indicator of talent he relies on, given prizes for these
8Here it is important to acknowledge that the vast majority of NFL teams are governed by two positions: The Headcoach and
the General Manager. Usually the General Manager is primarily responsible for personnel decisions for both staff and players.
He is in charge to hire and ﬁre players and his decisions do not necessarily have to be in accordance with the Headcoach.
7talent indicators. If there are strong hiring preferences regarding player features in Z, it is a reasonable
assumption to state that the prize will be rather high as large manifestations of Z will not be available
in large quantities. This will result in a situation where pZ
t > pX
t . Z is public information available
to everybody at zero cost, while X can only be assessed by studying college achievements og players,
carrying out scouting and having a good general knowledge of a their abilities and potential. So, i.e., it
is more convenient and, at ﬁrst sight, cheaper 9 to rely on Z as the main, albeit not sole, indicator for
player potential instead of X. The downside, however, is the higher risk that is involved and, of course,
the higher price resulting from high overall league-demand for high manifestations of Z. Solving the








t = 0: (7)









In order to capture the cost resulting from evaluating X, i.e. the cost of scouting, we introduce a cost
parameter cs. This parameter is a multiplicative cost parameter, which has a special character: These
costs are not of ﬁxed-cost nature but extra unit costs. The notion is very simple: The more and the better





1; if x < ¯ x
en; if x > ¯ x
(9)
The intuition of costs cs is straight forward: The existence of a threshold value ¯ x indicates that
information on players is available at zero cost up to this threshold level of ¯ x2X, where costs of scouting
information on player talent starts to rise exponentially to inﬁnity. This indicates that in reality the whole
set of indicators technically can never fully discovered. Here one could argue that gaining and processing
information on X is always associated with some ﬁxed cost like costs resulting from running a scouting
9It is cheaper in the process because running a big scouting department and arranging a large number of player meetings is
a rather costly procedure.
8department. Including these ﬁxed cost in would not be difﬁcult, but it would certainly not change the
results derived later. So here we deﬁne X as a set X = fx1;x2:::¯ x;:::xjg and cs as a function of X.








The implications of equation10 are rather trivial: If the GM wants to maximize team output by de-
ciding on the set of players he drafts, he has to compare the ratios of beneﬁts from X and Z, respectively,
as well as the prices of these factors. His decision will depend on the cost of evaluating X, the price levels
pZ
t and pX





the decision will be in favor of relying mostly on Z, as there are no costs associated with this and the GM
has complete information on Z. If one wants to create a more realistic setup and include cs as the cost of
scouting, i.e. deviate from the basic assumption and return to a situation where pZ
t > pX
t cs holds, then the
GM’s approach could be different. As compared to a situation with equal marginal returns and equality
in prices, which is described by pZ
t < pX
t cs a situation where the price for one unit of Z is greater than
the price for one unit of X, X should be preferred as the main signal for talent until the additional costs
from scouting raise the overall price of X over pZ
t . Consequently, in a situation where pX
t cs < pZ
t indeed
holds, teams should prefer to rely heavily on evaluating X as the signal for talent to build their rosters.
From this model we can now derive the following two propositions:
Proposition 1. In a situation with no hiring preferences for characteristics in Z exist a situation with
pZ
t = pX
t should be observable. If hiring preferences for Z exist prizes forZ should increase as weobserve
ﬁxed supply of Z in the draft system. This should lead to a situation where pZ
t > pX
t cs holds and hiring
preferences push the prize for Z above the prize of X including cost for scouting Cs.
Proposition 2. If it is the case that ¶Y
¶X = ¶Y
¶Z either X or Z are good indicators for talent. If ¶Y
¶Z is equal
to 0, or sufﬁciently close to 0, one can conclude that Z is not an efﬁcient indicator for player talent.
It will be the objective of following sections to ﬁnd evidence in favor of Propositions1 and 2. If it
turnsoutthatcharacteristicscapturedinZ aremerelywithoutapositiveefﬁciencyeffectintheproduction
process concerning technical efﬁciency, it is disadvantageous for a team to go for high values of Z in
the draft and overpay for an indicator that is no good signal for talent. I. e., we should not observe a
tendency of teams to draft players with high Zs earlier because it will lead to higher costs and work
9against the restriction of the salary cap. Instead of overpaying by coveting Z, teams should further
increase their scouting expenditures to a level of cs, where pZ
t = pX
t cs holds. Or they should simply make
their scouting more efﬁcient. If they invest heavily in scouting and ﬁnd a talented player with lower
physical measurements they will still beneﬁt despite the increased costs because high investments into
scouting are relatively cheap if high demand for Z raises pZ
t .
Concerning the other focus, the labor market for players, the consequences are even stronger: If
teams mainly base their hiring decisions on characteristics in Z, there is an increased possibility that this
hiring bias will lead to adverse selection in the labor market of collegiate football players. This will
result in a situation where talented players are overlooked because they do not meet certain ‘minimum-
requirements’in values of Z that are deﬁned and coveted by teams. It would lead to inefﬁciencies in the
labor market that would essentially leave many players unemployed and waste a certain amount of human
capital because teams simply refuse to scout player below minimum characteristics. Even if players with
low values of Z are indeed drafted they will not get the initial salary they deserve.
Another aspect is that these inefﬁcient hiring preferences will provide a great incentive for cheating
in the form of using prohibited substances to improve certain physical characteristics. Numerous recent
medical studies (see for example Dickinson, Goldberg, Elliot, Spratt, Rogol and Fish (2005); Buzzini
(2007)) point out that the usage of human growth hormones among college athletes has increased dra-
matically. Hiring preferences in the form as described above provide a perfect explanation for this:
Imagine a young Highschool athlete who plans to take on college football and plays a position on the
Offensive line in Highschool football. It is most likely that at the time he leaves Highschool and gets
recruited by a college program he may not have reached his full body size. Still, at today’s competitive
environment in NCAA football, he will feel pressure to stay committed to his initial playing position of
choice, even if it turns out that he will never quite reach the minimum measurements deﬁned by NFL
teams for Offense Line players10. One could argue that this will ultimately lead to a selection process
where only those who have the adequate measures will succeed. While this is certainly a good argument,
there will be a strong incentive to use growth enhancing substances if possibilities are present. But not
only preferences for physical attributes in Z will lead to questionable situations. If NFL teams also show
preferences for players out of proliﬁc football colleges, which is certainly a component of Z as well, the
recruitment process for major football colleges in Division IA colleges will get more competitive. This
will consequently increase the likelihood of overcompetitive reactions from both players and colleges11.
10Shifting positions is rather rare due to the complex structure of the game of Football. Although some players make
successful transitions from one position to another position switching is a rather exceptional thing in the NFL. This is deﬁnitely
true for the type of position categorization as it is done for the underlying data.
11This can explain incidents like the fake recruitment decision of Mike Hart, who announced at a press conference that he
104 Preferences in the Draft.
The implications of the presented model are rather trivial: If there is high demand for Z it is inefﬁcient
to make draft decisions based on Z as it will raise the cost for teams. Instead they should scout for a
similarly talented (with an equal value of G) player, i.e. invest in the increase of knowledge of X, with
lower values of Z. This player will be cheaper available later in the draft as long as the scouting costs
do not push the price over the level as it would be if high levels of Z were targeted (pX
t cs < pZ
t ). In the
special framework of the NFL and its salary cap this implication is even more convincing: As scouting
costs would not enter a player’s contract they would not count against the salary cap and therefore create
an advantage for a team that invests in scouting instead of following the trend and count on Z. For a
critical discussion of the strong emphasis on body measurements in the NFL draft consult Oates and
Durham (2004)
So far little research has been done on the NFL draft and the teams’ ability to evaluate and ﬁnd talent
12. In this section it is the major objective to clarify whether there actually are strong preferences for
certain physical characteristics in the NFL player draft or not. To do this one can either argue with the
countless expert analysis of college players hoping to become professional football players, or, in order
to follow a more scientiﬁc way, do a basic econometric analysis of draft data. This section will follow
both ways in an attempt to argue in favor of the existence of hiring preferences.
4.1 Experts
One of the most detailed Expert13 analysis of college players published annually by Lindy’s Lindy’s Pro
Football Draft (2009) lists several so called minimum characteristics of NFL players concerning their
size and weight14. In addition to this, they also state the NFL optimum level of size and weight for each
position. Taking a closer look at these optimum values of size it is striking that those characteristics
can be perceived as well above average human measurements and even above average values for NFL
players. If we compare them to the average values for physical characteristics of players we see that the
optimal characteristics according to experts still are relatively high. If we look at Offense Line players,
for example, we see that the Lindy’s suggests an optimal size for them at 6 feet 6 inches and a minimal
had chosen the university of California (Berkeley) over the University of Oregon to play College Football there. Later it turned
out that neither college football program had actually made an attempt to recruit him.
12Spurr (2000) analyzes the ability of baseball teams to ﬁnd talent in the MLB draft, but the NFL draft has not been the focus
of research yet.
13Bigler and Jeffries (2008) focuses on the evaluation of Black Quarterbacks draft prospects by experts.
14These optimal and minimal characteristics did not vary in the three most recent editions of Lindy’s Pro Football Draft
magazine
11size of 6 feet 4 for an Offensive Tackle, 6 - 4 for a Guard and 6 - 3 for a Center. Table3 shows that the
average size of a running backs optimal size is deﬁned as 6 - 2, which is two inches taller than the league
average for starters at the Running Back position. Optimal quarterback size is assessed at 6 - 4, which
is also signiﬁcantly over the league average for starting Quarterbacks. An optimal wide receiver is said
to be 6 - 4, while average starting NFL receiver only stood 6 - 2 from 2000 to 2007. Table3 compares
optimal levels for various important positions to actual averages in size. It is easy to see that from 2000
to 2007 this was exactly the situation in the NFL for Wide Receivers, Quarterbacks, Running Backs,
Linebackers and Defensive Backs.
It is obvious that for most positions the average size is close to the size experts and analysts consider
to be the minimal value. This certainly suggests a strong tendency to look for taller players in the draft if
we assume hiring decisions follow expert opinions that taller means better. As there seemingly are few
players of optimal size there has to be a high prize for these players. In the context of the NFL draft
this means that they will be drafted early and cost their teams plenty of salary cap room because they
will demand big contracts. Consequently, if we observe a situation where the average player is below
the optimal level of size, this will create a downward push on the value of smaller players and an upward
push on 15 the prize of taller players.
Table 1: Experts vs. averages.a
Experts optimum Experts minimum Average Size
QB 6 - 4 6 - 0 appr. 6 - 3
RB 6 - 2 5 - 9 appr. 5 - 11
WR 6 - 4 5 - 10 appr. 6 - 2
LBb 6 - 3; 6 - 2 6 - 0; 5 - 11 appr. 6 - 2
DBc 6 - 1; 6 - 2 5 - 9; 5 - 11 appr. 6 - 0
a Size measured in feet - inches. Expert values taken from
Lindy’s 2009 NFL Draft magazine. Linemen (Offense and De-
fense) were omitted due to high degree of differentiation. b First
value is for Outside Linebackers, second for Inside Linebackers.
c First value is for Cornerbacks, second for Safeties.
4.2 More elaborate data analysis
As the experts assessments are basically an outsider opinion which have no scientiﬁc incidence and do
not necessarily mean that the people in charge of teams, the General Managers, do actually decide along
15Or players measuring exactly the optimal size as assessed by experts.
12these preferences published by analysts. Moreover, one could argue that a sports periodical is far from
being an adequate source for a proof of a scientiﬁc proposition. In order to have a stronger argument an
econometric analysis was done to thoroughly test the theory that there are strong preferences for players
with rather extreme physical attributes16. In order to do this NFL roster data acquired from http:
//www.pro-football-reference.com/ consisting of over 4;200 individual players were analyzed to
show if physical characteristics actually did improve draft status of players in the past. Tables4 and 5
presents the results from an ordered logit model testing the hypothesis of hiring preferences.
From the results one can see that a player’s size and weight during the period from 2000 to 2007 had
a signiﬁcant positive17 inﬂuence on when he was drafted. Simply put: The taller a player was, the earlier
he was drafted and, consequently, the higher was his salary. The results also indicate that weight had a
positive inﬂuence as well if we look at the coefﬁcient of a the weight of a player. While the statistically
signiﬁcant effect of weight disappears when the sample of players was reduced to drafted players (see
table5), the inﬂuence of size turns out to be robust. Overall the differences between an analysis including
undrafted players and the one excluding them are minimal. Only weight and top 10 players turn out to
be insigniﬁcant in the sample without undrafted players.
Table2 presents the predicted probabilities to be drafted in the ﬁrst round of the NFL draft for three
major positions in football, based on the ordered probit results presented in tabel4. It is obvious that
a player who stands 190 centimeters faces a substantially higher probability of being a ﬁrst round draft
pick than a player with the size of 170 centimeters. The table also distinguishes probabilities for players
from a top 10 college program and for those from lower ranked programs. Again we can observe that
probabilities to get drafted in round 1 are much higher for both measurements of size when a player is
from a top 10 college. It is also an interesting result that the difference in probabilities concerning sizes
170 and 190 centimeters is larger when players are from a top college. Thus it seems that in the case
of players from these colleges there is even more emphasis put on size than for those who are not. This
is consistent with the fact that players from top ranked colleges are more represented in the media and
players from fringe college programs are sometimes well kept secrets that need more scouting initially
simply to ﬁnd them. The biggest difference was found for Quarterbacks out of top 10 colleges, where
QBs measuring 190 cm face a 5:7 % higher probability to get drafted than those who stand 170 cm. A
QB from a top 10 college with size of 190 cm is drafted in round 1 with a probability of over 15 % which
is a very high probability. A Quarterback who stands 170 cm faces only about half the probability as one
who stands 190 and is coming out of a top 10 college
16In the context of the model presented in section3 our Z.
17Indicated by a negative inﬂuence in the Ordered Probit Results
13Table 2: Predicted probabilities for being drafted in round 1a.
Wide Receivers
Top 10 college Predicted probability Predicted probability Difference
Size: 170 cm Size: 190 cm
No 0.0762 0.1235 0.0473
Yes 0.0923 0.1478 0.0555
Running Backs
Top 10 college Predicted probability Predicted probability Difference
Size: 170 cm Size: 190 cm
No 0.0589 0.0965 0.0376
Yes 0.0716 0.1163 0.0447
Quarterbacks
Top 10 college Predicted probability Predicted probability Difference
Size: 170 cm Size: 190 cm
No 0.0787 0.1272 0.0485
Yes 0.0951 0.1521 0.057
Predicted probabilities based on mean ordered logit results including undrafted players (8 draft rounds).
After reviewing the simple, yet effective, methodology how preferences for high levels of certain
characteristics and physical measurements were analyzed, one could argue that those results are merely
a result of omitted variable bias, because the estimation models do not include any measurement of
production in college as a proxy for talent. As Hendricks, DeBrock and Koenker (2003) point out, NFL
administrative sources and media do have an enormous amount of data on hundreds of college football
players including highly detailed information on intelligence evaluation tests, records of behavior and
many other details including results from work outs like the NFL combine18. The argument in favor of
such a simple methodology is the following: As only in-league players are subject of the analysis one can
make the assumption that, on average, the talent level of these players should be rather close together.
All players were at one point evaluated as having enough talent for the league and so leaving out all
the possible talent-signal variables would not spoil the results obtained by the multi-nominal models
discussed above. This should at least be true for Xs that are scouted at no or very low costs.19 While
control variables measuring productivity on the collegiate level as well as workout statistics indicating
physical ability would be of great value results might actually not differ much qualitatively.
One possibility to control talent is to include career length, which should at least partly control for
talent and consequently productiveness in College Football. This is supported by the fact that the variable
18The NFL Combine is an annual pre-draft event where invited college athletes work out in front of NFL coaches, scouts and
analysts.
19One possible area of future research on hiring preference would be to integrate college production into an analysis similar
to the one carried out in this paper. So far data availability has provided major setbacks to this.
14career length exhibits a negative coefﬁcient in model II of table6, meaning that players with longer
careers were drafted in early rounds. In addition to this, it appears crucial to control for high ranked
college players by including a dummy which takes the value 1 if the player played on a top 20 ranked
college in the NCAA. Finally one has to disentangle the complex nature of the game and its demand for
players of various body types by including position dummies at a reasonable level of differentiation of 9
position groups 20.
If we look at drafting a player to be essentially an investment, we can apply some theoretical im-
plication of the theory of investment under uncertainty21 (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)) to the ﬁndings
of the regression analysis of this section it can be seen that the results are perfectly ﬁtting the theory’s
implications: Given the assumption that all players should have a combination of talent indicators that
are within a tight band, it is a reasonable strategy for teams to go for the one signal that might tell them
the most about future potential because it is rather invariant, i. e. factors like size, weight or the NCAA
football rank of college. The fact that players are drafted later if their measurements are lower, i.e. per-
ceived as suboptimal, or they are from a low ranked college football program ﬁts the idea of investment
theory that teams will want to give those players some time on their roster to prove themselves because
releasing them after only a short time is less expensive22. So if one Offensive line player who stands
6 2 has the same college stats as a second Offensive line player who stands 6 7 teams will pursue the
taller player ﬁrst not only because they think his superior size is an indicator of more talent, but also due
to the fact that a failure of the smaller player will simply be cheaper as he will receive a lower contract
involving less guaranteed salary if he is drafted later. Should size turn out to be the right signal and the
smaller player is the weaker one or even fails to make the roster this will cost the team less. So teams
will look for the size advantage in any case, even if size is not the adequate talent signal.
5 Data and Methodology
The data for this paper were collected from the Pro-Football References web-page23. All variables
present per-year averages created from NFL roster ﬁles of at least 60 players. In order to capture the fact
that only inputs that are actually a substantial part of the production process only players who started 7
or more games were included. For more details on data refer to the Data Appendix.
20These groups are: Running Back, Quarterback, Fullbacks, Wide Receiver, Defensive Linemen, Offensive Linemen, Kick-
ers, Defensive Backs and Linebackers.
21A drafted player can certainly be seen as an investment and there is sufﬁcient uncertainty involved in the draft process.
22This is simply a result of contracting rules in the NFL. Releasing a player with a large contract is more expansive than
ﬁring a player with a contract rather close to the minimum.
23To be found online at http://www.pro-football-reference.com/.
15In order to test the effect of individual player characteristics on overall team success the most obvious
and straight forward approach would be a model explaining some success measure, like the amount of
total wins per season, by some explanatory variables and the set of characteristics. While this approach
might look appealing at ﬁrst sight, it does not really capture the complex nature of the game of American
Football as it is played in the NFL. In the recent literature on sport economics and team productivity efﬁ-
ciency analysis has become an often employed methodology to model the complex nature of productivity
in sports econometrically and get a better notion of how success in sports is really achieved.
This paper will adapt a methodology often applied in agricultural analysis. I will estimate a stochastic
production frontier in the context of American Football. The model will take the general form of
Yt = bXt  Ut +Vt; t = 1;:::;T (11)
where Xt is a vector of inputs to produce outputYt,Ut is a vector of inefﬁciency parameters andVt is
an ideosyncratic error term with iidN(0;s2
v). Following Battese and Coelli (1995), the inefﬁciency term
is modeled as linear dependent of a set of explanatory variables, in this context the player characteristics
in the 1K vector Zt:
Ut = g0+gZt; t = 1;:::;T: (12)





bjxjit  uit +nit; i = 1:::K t = 1;:::;T; (13)
where the subscript i denominates the team, t the season and j is an index for the different inputs.





gkzkit i = 1:::K t = 1;:::;T: (14)
where zkit is the personal characteristic k of team i in the seasont. The model presented in equation14
was also used in Battese and Coelli (1995) to measure agricultural efﬁciency with the consideration of
16farm-speciﬁc productivity effects, as well as in numerous other papers. Here this notion is transferred to
the world of sport by basically respecting the presence of team speciﬁc efﬁciency effects resulting from
heterogeneous players as important factors in the production process. This heterogeneity is induced by
the differences in teams’ hiring preferences and in their way of building and managing their work force,
i.e. the team roster. The main focus of the analysis is to test the inﬂuence of the way a team is built
concerning certain before-mentioned player characteristics on production efﬁcient. If the results show
that the same characteristics that inﬂuence the hiring process in the NFL draft have little or even no effect
on team efﬁciency then the hiring behavior, or hiring preferences, are in itself inefﬁcient.
One of the most challenging tasks in efﬁciency analysis, and speciﬁcally in stochastic frontier anal-
ysis, is the speciﬁcation of a suitable form of production function. This is even more difﬁcult if such a
highly complex production process as in sports is the matter of interest. While it may already be trouble-
some to formulate such a production function for sports like Basketball, Ice Hockey or Soccer, it is even
more challenging to capture the elaborate multi-leveled nature of American Football. As an American
Football team is divided into three subdivisions we have at least three separate units of production with
completely different sets of input factors. As already mentioned before, one of the three subdivisions,
namely special teams, will be completely left out due to reasons of simpliﬁcation. So we are left with
Offense and Defense as the two main components of any football team. One of the simplest approaches
to the production process in Football is the addressing of the main target of the whole game: the gain or
defense of space on the playing ﬁeld, measured in yards. While it is the intention of the offense squad
to gain yards on every down, the Defense will try to avoid giving them up. This statistical measurement
is, on the one hand, the true core of how the game works, on the other hand it is the most rudimentary
indicator of performance, effort and ability. Still it does not fully predict the ﬁnal product, which will
be measured in win percentage as the ratio of wins over total games played. As a conclusion the two
main inputs in the underlying production function will be yards per play on offense and yards per play on
defense. In order to capture other performance related effects an additional variable will be included as a
control variable that represent a form of performance shock as a result of errors, lack of concentration or
motivation, by both teams competing. This will be the ratio of interceptions made to interceptions com-
mitted. The ratio of fumbles forced to fumbles made24 would also be available, but the results of earlier
regressions came up with somewhat puzzling results for this second control variable, hinting there could
be a measurement problem or speciﬁcation issues. Therefore only the interception ratio was included to
24In American Football the term Interception is used to describe the event when a forward pass is intercepted by a defender
and the ball is therefore turned over to the other team. A fumble describes a turnover as well, with the only difference that it is
a result of merely dropping the ball and having an opposing defender pick it up.
17capture shocks within the production function. This leaves us with a production function of the following
form:
Y =YOb1YDb2: (15)
As mentioned before, the ﬁnal product or output Y will be measured in the amount of total wins
per season over the maximum number of wins possible, which is 16. This form of production function
uses two inputs: production on offense, i.e. yards gained, and production on defense, i.e. yards allowed.
Linearizing this Cobb-Douglas type production function above and including the error shock ratios as




it +eituit +vit; (16)
where the error term eit is decomposed into
eit = vit  uit: (17)
The conditional mean error term in the frontier model employed in this section regresses the mean of
the inefﬁciency term u on a set of exogenous variables. For the purpose of this paper two different sets are
created to analyze their effect on production efﬁciency of NFL teams. Set 1 (non physical characteristics
as well as control variables) includes the average round all players with more than 6 starts per season
were drafted, their average career as well as a career squared term allowing for a cubic relationship, and
a variable that counts the number of players drafted out of a top 10 as well as 20 college program. Set
2 is a set of average values of physical measurements for players with 7 or more stats per season. Both
sets are somewhat related, as it was possible to show that certain physical attributes inﬂuence the round
a player is drafted in. The empirical analysis also consists of a model including both sets of variables
and one additionally controlling for coaching changes25 Fizel and D’Itri (1999) gives a good overview
on how efﬁciency and changes in leadership (i.e. management or in our case coaching) are inﬂuencing
each other.
25It is critical to notice that usually it is a difﬁcult task to include coaching changes in regressions explaining success in
sports, as there has to be a high degree of endogeneity. This is due to the fact that coaches inﬂuence success but success will
also have an inﬂuence on the job safety of the coach. In our analysis, however, we can safely neglect this endogeneity problem
because coaching is only allowed to have an inﬂuence on the efﬁciency term and not on the dependent variable. Here we are
only interested in the inﬂuence of having changed the Headcoach of a team on the team’s production efﬁciency.
186 Results
The results derived from stochastic frontier analysis introduced in section5 are presented in Table626.
In the basic model speciﬁcation (I), where only the simple production function is estimated, all signs
and magnitudes of coefﬁcients are as expected. This is also the case for all other model speciﬁcations.
The result supports the speciﬁcation of the basic production function. The only surprising result is the
negative coefﬁcient on the Fumble ratio. As an increase of this variable measures an improvement in
the ratio of fumbles forced to fumbles committed, one would certainly expect a positive inﬂuence of this
control variable on the win ratio. One explanation for this puzzling result could be that both variables
from which the ratio was constructed do not necessarily indicate turnovers as they are not net-values:
They represent only the overall number of fumbles without indication whether possession of the ball
changed or was retained.
6.1 Physical characteristics
The results in Table6 concerning physical characteristics of players tell a clear story: There is no indica-
tion that physical characteristics do have much of an inﬂuence on technical efﬁciency. The only position
that seems to have some inﬂuence is the position of Wide Receiver. Here two model speciﬁcations (III
and V) yield a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on efﬁciency. While a Wide Receiver’s weight seems
to reduces inefﬁciency, there is some evidence that his size actually increases it. In addition to this the
results show that the average weight of a team’s starting running backs increases technical inefﬁciency.
An explanation for this could be the fact that a higher weight for a running back might indicate less speed
or agility which could be the reason for the negative inﬂuence on efﬁciency. All other physical charac-
teristics, however, show no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on technical efﬁciency and they are unable to deliver an
explanation for the presence of efﬁciency differences.
One notable result is that in model (V) all before mentioned statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuences of
average physical characteristics of starting players are still present if we include a binary variable taking
the value 1 if the year is one after the team has changed coaches. This coaching change dummy has a
highly signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence on inefﬁciency and should take care for most team heterogeneity.
Only the signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for average Wide Receiver weight turns out insigniﬁcant.
26All three models were estimated using the FRONTIER command in STATA.
196.2 Other control variables
In addition to pure physical characteristics it is important to control for additional player characteristics
that could inﬂuence his draft status. One important control variable is the status of the college program
a player originates from. One might argue that the more players from top-ranked colleges a team has,
the more efﬁcient it should be. Another important inﬂuence on efﬁciency could be a player’s experience,
which will be measured as average career length of starting players on the roster in a particular season.
It is reasonable to include a quadratic term because one can assume a non-linear relationship between
efﬁciency and experience. One might even go further and assume a positive but declining relation be-
tween experience and efﬁciency. This could be due to declining physical ability or the increasing number
of minor or major injuries over the time span of a career. As an addition to this it is also important to
include one of the seemingly appropriate quality measures of a team, namely the average draft pick of
starters, into the empirical analysis.
The results in table6 show that the the whole set of control variables and non-physical character-
istic explaining the systematic inefﬁciency term uit in Model speciﬁcations (II) through (V), have very
little inﬂuence on technical efﬁciency. The average round players were drafted turns out to have no sta-
tistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on technical efﬁciency at all. Only speciﬁcation (II) yields a signiﬁcant
negative, but small, inﬂuence of the average draft pick of a team on production efﬁciency. But as soon
as physical characteristics are included into the model of the conditional efﬁciency term this positive
effect on efﬁciency disappears. Neither the experience of a player (as well as the quadratic term), nor the
distinction if he played college football at a top 10 or 20 ranked College seems to have any inﬂuence on
technical efﬁciency. So the reasonable assumption that more experience players from ‘better ’colleges
are improving a team’s efﬁciency turns out to be wrong. This could be interpreted the following way:
Teams with more experienced and higher drafted players do not dominate other teams using the same
basic inputs in the production function, because they are not playing more efﬁciently.
In general, the results even raise doubt on the relation the draft position of teams and their production
efﬁciency: There is little evidence that having more players on the roster that were drafted in early rounds
increases technical efﬁciency. While this is surprising, it might reﬂect that the criteria that inﬂuence draft
choices are partly irrelevant and leading to undesired outcomes. This becomes evident as the coefﬁcient
of the variable measuring the average player’s draft round is not signiﬁcant in any model speciﬁcation
presented in Table6. Another clear indication of draft inefﬁciencies is that there is no evidence to be
found supporting a positive inﬂuence of the number of players from top colleges on efﬁciency: The
20results of model speciﬁcation (II) show an actually negative inﬂuence of the number of players from
elite colleges27 on the efﬁciency parameter. Simply put, having many players from the top-level football
colleges on the roster increases technical inefﬁciency. However, this positive effect on the inefﬁciency
parameter disappears if we control for physical characteristics in speciﬁcations (IV) and (V) when we
control for coaching changes. In addition to this the number of players out of the 20 top colleges has no
statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on efﬁciency.
7 Conclusion
After it was possible to ﬁnd evidence in favor of proposition1, i.e. that there is a number player charac-
teristics that clearly inﬂuence the hiring decisions of NFL teams (see section4), it was possible to show
that most of these characteristics are not systematically determining efﬁciency. This is clearly to be in-
terpreted as a strong argument supporting major aspects of proposition2. The main conclusion from the
results of the frontier analysis carried out is that the player characteristics, that are one of the main tar-
gets for teams in the NFL draft, do actually have little overall inﬂuence on technical efﬁciency. Although
measuring technical efﬁciency does only cover certain aspects of the successful production process of
a professional football team, it is certainly possible to conclude that the criteria for draft decisions are
partly irrelevant and leading to suboptimal results. Looking at it in more detail, we can argue that the
drafting preferences of teams create inefﬁciencies via two different channels: First, there is within-team
inefﬁciency because the demand for players with high measurements causes the price for players offering
these measurements to rise relative to others who do not have these features. This leads to a higher team
salaries which will, in the presence of a binding salary cap, leave the team endowed with a lower overall
talent level at the same maximum overall team salary restricted by the salary cap28. The second chan-
nel of inefﬁciency which has even more severe implications and is the focus of this paper is operating
through the labor market of college players. If teams prefer certain characteristics in NCAA players they
will tend to overlook players who do not ﬁt their model of an ideal player and still may have a sufﬁciently
high level of talent. This will lead to a situation where adverse selection dominates and a lot of human
capital or talent is left unutilized in the labor market. It might even be the case that certain players com-
pletely fall off the table and end up unemployed after their eligibility to play in the NCAA ends. On the
one hand teams will suffer from this as they miss out on relatively cheap resources of employees. On the
27Here ‘elite ’meaning one of the most successful colleges in the highest level of collegiate competition in NCAA history.
28This argument even extends to the point where we would consequently observe a team salary structure which is highly
unequally structured with some highly paid players taking the major share of the salary cap room. As Borghesi (2008) ﬁnds
this inequality in payments has a negative inﬂuence on team success.
21other hand the most problematic consequences arise for players who might have enough talent to play in
the NFL, but are either too short, have not put on enough weight or played collegiate football at a low
ranked college. Keeping in mind that a Div.IA NCAA Football player has had little or basically no time
to do anything else than dedicate his full attention to football at basically zero monetary compensation,
we can conclude that this has serious consequences on hundreds of young players who end up being
jobless and have not graduated due to lack of time to focus on studying. It is certainly hard to justify
why players actually end up being left-overs due to lacking certain characteristics if some important cri-
teria for draft decisions based on these characteristics actually turn out to be more or less irrelevant for
the later production process. While one might argue that one major compensation for NCAA collegiate
football players is the opportunity to earn a university degree for free, this argument is somewhat weak
in the presence of only 64 percent graduation success rate in NCAA Division I football in 2005 29.
From an organizational perspective one strategy for an NFL team to avoid hiring inefﬁciencies based
on the overvaluation of irrelevant characteristics would be to trade down in the draft, invest highly in
scouting and predominantly hire less coveted players in later rounds who do not display optimal physical
characteristics. This will enable the team to end up with a set of players that will sign rather cheap
contractsandstillmightbeastalentedasothers. Thisstrategywillworkasotherteamswillsimplyignore
these players in early rounds and they will still be available later in the draft. The results of this paper at
least suggest that production efﬁciency will not suffer from such a strategy. As the NFL is a league with
very strong salary cap regulations saving contract volume is a necessity for teams to stay competitive
over a longer period of time. Is is certainly possible to conclude that physical characteristics size and
weight, as well as the ranking of college a player originates from are weak signals for talent. From the
labor market perspective one could assess that the NCAA as well as the NFL should have an interest to
optimize the labor market for pro football players. Although there is no clear policy implication how to
achieve this, it is certainly true that hiring graduation rates as well as building up some kind of league
ﬁnanced social security system for collegiate players who fail to make it to Professional Football. Not to
mention that the current NCAA policy of zero monetary compensation and the cartel power of colleges
are highly questionable.
Summing up, this paper argues that there is little evidence that certain player characteristics have
any inﬂuence on team efﬁciency, although there are convincing indications that certain preferences for
them do exist. The analysis only ﬁnds some inﬂuence for two physical parameters of two positions in
29Data from the 2005 NCAA Division I Graduation Success Rate (GSR) Data report available at www.ncaa.com. Values for
2006 and 2007 are 65% and 67%. While there is certainly an increase in graduation rates it is still the case that one third of all
collegiate football players do not graduate. And this value could still be biased from colleges who have a strict pro graduation
policy like Notre Dame.
22football, namely Wide Receivers and Running Backs but no statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence of other
non-physical characteristics. There, however, is some evidence that coaching changes have a signiﬁcant
negative inﬂuence on efﬁciency. In the context of labor markets this paper demonstrates how irrational
hiring preferences can drive up the cost of certain types of workers and discriminate others to an extent
where they might end up being unemployed.
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268 Data appendix
NFL Roster data: Data on players were collected from http://www.pro-football-reference.com/
in May 2008. This data was rearranged, checked and formed into a panel of 32 NFL teams and their
players from 2000 to 2007. In order to capture the desired efﬁciency effects only starting players were
include. A starter was deﬁned as a player who started at least 6 games in a season. http://www.
pro-football-reference.com/. gives information about games participated and games started, so
it was easy to form a panel only consisting of starters. Although there is no clear deﬁnition on which
player can be called a starter in the NFL it is arguably a safe assumption to say that 7 starts qualify for
the category starter as 7 games are just below 50 percent of all season games. Including also players
with lower levels of contribution might lead to a situation where player features and characteristics are
included which are not sufﬁciently part of the production process because they are not on the ﬁeld of
play. Players who were drafted before 1987 were omitted in the analysis of section4.
All physical characteristics variables were created from the overall roster panel by collapsing the
individual values into team by year averages. All size values were transformed to cm and weight is
measured in US pounds.
The coaching change variable is based on data on coaching tenures for all 32 teams in the NFl also
available at http://www.pro-football-reference.com/. The binary variable takes the value 1 in a
year where a new coach has his ﬁrst season or part of it on a new team, else it takes the value 0.
Team statistics were collected from http://www.pro-football-reference.com/. and several
variables were constructed from the multitude of team stats available. The dependent variable in the
efﬁciency model, win ratio, is a variable measuring the ratio of number of games won against games
played in a season. This essentially boils down to wins
16 because every team in the NFL played exactly 16
regular season games in the 7 seasons from 2000 to 2007.
The binary variable indicating if a player was drafted out of a top 10 or top 20 college program was
generated based on multiple all-time college rankings available online. All of these rankings are mostly
based on a college’s performance over it’s total existence.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics - NFL Roster Data.
Variable Observ. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Win ratio 253 0.48 0.19 0.06 1.19
Yards per play Offense 253 5.12 0.52 3.8 7
Yards per play Defense 253 5.13 0.39 4.2 6.3
PLAYERS’ ATTRIBUTES
Average Draft Pick 253 38.23 24.05 1 115.5
Career 253 4.85 1.4 1.6 9.2
Career Squared 253 25.53 14.56 2.56 84.64
Numb. of Top 10 Coll. Players 253 4.61 1.86 0 13
Numb. of Top 20 Coll. Players 253 8.48 2.46 2 16
PLAYERS’ PHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES
(Averages over all 32 teams from 2000 to 2007)
Avg. OL Size 253 194.21 1.61 190.5 197.61
Avg. OL Weight 253 312.09 8.43 286 339
Avg. DL Size 253 191.84 2.1 186.69 198.12
Avg.DL Weight 253 292.34 9.64 268.8 325
Avg. WR Size 253 188.6 1 185.53 191.45
Avg. WR Weight 253 254.29 4.25 243.7 266.67
Avg. QB Size 251 190.58 3.74 177.8 198.12
Avg. QB Weight 251 223.5 12.13 180 264
Avg. LB Size 253 187.36 2.01 181.19 191.35
Avg. LB Weight 253 242.25 6 227.67 257
Avg. RB Size 252 180.95 3.97 172.72 193.04
Avg. RB Weight 252 221.1 14.19 180 290.5
Avg. DB Size 253 182.15 1.97 175.26 189.23
Avg. DB Weight 253 199.88 4.95 186.5 217.25
28Table 4: Ordered logit model to trace draft preferences (part 1)a.
Model 1 Marginal effects for outcomes 1 - 8b
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Size -0.027*** 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.006
(0.007)
Weight -0.010*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002
(0.002)
Career length -0.368*** 0.029 0.026 0.020 0.013 0.004 -0.003 -0.010 -0.079
(0.033)
Career length sq. 0.017*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004
(0.003)
Top 10 College -0.208** 0.018 0.015 0.011 0.006 0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.043
(0.090)
Top 20 College -0.833*** 0.077 0.062 0.043 0.021 0.001 -0.012 -0.026 -0.165
(0.070)
Offense lineman -0.089 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.019
(0.211)
Fullback -0.384 0.036 0.029 0.020 0.010 0.000 -0.006 -0.013 -0.076
(0.250)
Defense lineman -0.405** 0.036 0.030 0.022 0.011 0.001 -0.006 -0.013 -0.082
(0.181)
Wide receiver -1.433*** 0.178 0.106 0.050 0.007 -0.020 -0.036 -0.051 -0.235
(0.177)
Tight end -0.311* 0.028 0.023 0.017 0.009 0.001 -0.004 -0.010 -0.063
(0.166)
Quarterback -1.467*** 0.198 0.107 0.043 -0.002 -0.027 -0.040 -0.054 -0.224
(0.238)
Linebacker -0.798*** 0.081 0.061 0.039 0.016 -0.003 -0.016 -0.028 -0.150
(0.169)
Defensive back -1.524*** 0.180 0.112 0.057 0.013 -0.016 -0.034 -0.052 -0.260
(0.167)
Running back -1.157*** 0.136 0.088 0.046 0.010 -0.014 -0.028 -0.042 -0.197
(0.171)
Team ﬁxed effects Yes
Year ﬁxed effects Yes
Number of observations 4262
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. Cut-point estimates in ordered logit model were
omitted. a Including players with missing draft rounds assumed to be undrafted and coded as drafted in round 8. b All outcomes
represent respective draft rounds in the NFL draft.
29Table 5: Ordered logit model to trace draft preferences (part 2)a.
Model 2 Marginal effects for outcomes 1 - 7b
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Size -0.041*** 0.005 0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
(0.009)
Weight -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002)
Career length -0.210*** 0.027 0.018 0.008 -0.004 -0.011 -0.016 -0.021
(0.034)
Career length sq. 0.009*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.002)
Top 10 college 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.129)
Top 20 college -0.730*** 0.100 0.061 0.020 -0.018 -0.040 -0.054 -0.068
(0.096)
Offense lineman 0.093 -0.011 -0.008 -0.004 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.010
(0.273)
Fullback 0.432 -0.047 -0.037 -0.021 0.001 0.020 0.034 0.051
(0.288)
Defense lineman -0.156 0.020 0.013 0.005 -0.003 -0.009 -0.012 -0.015
(0.260)
Wide receiver -0.857*** 0.135 0.065 0.008 -0.033 -0.050 -0.058 -0.067
(0.202)
Tight end 0.095 -0.012 -0.008 -0.004 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.010
(0.244)
Quarterback -0.622** 0.095 0.049 0.009 -0.023 -0.037 -0.043 -0.050
(0.280)
Linebacker -0.382 0.053 0.032 0.010 -0.011 -0.022 -0.028 -0.034
(0.240)
Defensive back -0.899*** 0.137 0.070 0.013 -0.031 -0.052 -0.062 -0.074
(0.226)
Running back -1.026*** 0.172 0.072 0.001 -0.044 -0.060 -0.066 -0.074
(0.227)
Team ﬁxed effects Yes
Year ﬁxed effects Yes
Number of observations 2836
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. Cut-point estimates in ordered logit model were
omitted. a Without any undrafted players. b All outcomes represent respective draft rounds in the NFL draft.
30Table 6: Efﬁciency analysis results.a
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Log of yards on offense 2.041*** 1.988*** 1.915*** 1.875*** 2.084***
(0.227) (0.227) (0.237) (0.238) (0.246)
Log of yards on defense -2.272*** -2.216*** -2.162*** -2.121*** -1.918***
(0.204) (0.204) (0.211) (0.212) (0.309)
Interception ratio 0.339*** 0.336*** 0.353*** 0.350*** 0.317***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.042)
INEFFICIENCY
SET 1
Draft Round 0.070 0.075 0.081
(0.062) (0.063) (0.058)
Draft pick -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Career -0.153 -0.242 -0.199
(0.292) (0.304) (0.276)
Career2 0.019 0.028 0.023
(0.029) (0.031) (0.028)
Out of top 10 college 0.031** 0.024 0.019
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
Out of top 20 college -0.004 0.001 0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
SET 2
Average RB weight 0.004* 0.005** 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Average RB size -0.003 -0.006 -0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Average WR weight -0.006* -0.004 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Average WR size 0.018* 0.013 0.016*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Average OL weight 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Average OL size 0.014 0.018 0.017
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
Average DL weight 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Average DL size 0.013 0.011 0.010
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Average LB weight -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Average LB size -0.019 -0.019 -0.018
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Average QB weight -0.004* -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Average QB size 0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Average DB weight 0.007 0.004 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Average DB size -0.003 0.002 -0.001
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Year after coaching change 0.102*
(0.055)
Constant 0.772*** 0.855 -5.217 -3.784 -3.102
(0.047) (0.739) (4.883) (5.275) (4.763)
Number of Observations 250 250 250 250 250
Standard Errors in parenthesis. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. a The dependent variable
is a logarithmic transformation of the win ratio. All size variables are measured in centimeter.
Weight is measured in US pounds. Stochastic frontier parameters were omitted.
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